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Recent studies of the citizen and citizenship in Aristotle, such as those of 
Hansen,1 Morrison,2 and Collins,3 have focused attention on a somewhat neglected topic 
in Aristotle’s work. While a definitive treatment of this topic awaits a comprehensive 
catalogue of the uses of politeia in the Politica and the Ath. at least, with over 500 
occurrences in the Politica alone, in this paper I contribute to the catalogue project by 
considering some examples of Aristotle’s use of politeia in idioms from earlier Greek 
literature which express participation in citizenship, giving a share in citizenship, and so 
on. I consider also Aristotle’s apparent awareness of inscriptions recording grants of 
citizenship. Understanding politeia as citizenship appears to provide attractive alternative 
interpretations for some otherwise challenging passages. 
 
Politeia in Literature 
 
Politeia, as the abstract noun cognate with the concrete nouns politēs (‘citizen’) 
and politis (‘citizeness’), should denote, in the usage of grammarians, a condition or a 
quality.4 It is a newer word than politēs, which may be found as far back as the Iliad in 
the appropriate sense.5 Conditions are different from the better known qualities. They are 
not simple as qualities are, and they are enjoyed rather than being possessed. Citizens are 
expected to possess the quality andreia, for example; but some citizens may possess 
andreia and others lack it while they both still enjoy the condition of citizenship, since 
they still are citizens. And some noncitizens might possess andreia even though they do 
not enjoy citizenship. Politeia denotes a condition that citizens enjoy but others do not, 
whatever qualities they possess or lack. 
While politeia is an abstract noun, the abstract can be used for the concrete in 
Greek as in English. As Denniston points out, this is a “common Greek idiom.”6 
Accordingly, one should expect politeia in Aristotle and others sometimes to be used for 
the citizens, just as, in Thucydides II.8.1, neotēs, or youth, is used for the young men, just 
as in English. The use of an abstract noun for the concrete as a matter of prose style, 
however, does not make it any the less an abstract noun. Thus politeia should not be 
understood as denoting a citizenry, or body of citizens, but as denoting the condition of 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1M.H. Hansen, “Polis, Politeuma, and Politeia: A Note on Arist. Pol. 1278b6-14,” in D. Whitehead (ed.), 
From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius: Sources for the Ancient Greek Polis (Stuttgart, 1994), 
pp. 91-98.. 
2D. Morrison, “Aristotle’s Definition of Citizenship: A Problem and Some Solutions,” History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 16 (1999), pp. 143-165. 
3S.D. Collins, Aristotle and the Rediscovery of Citizenship (Cambridge, 2006). 
44 H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar, rev. G.M. Messing (Cambridge, 1984), p. 46, 199.c. 
5(Β.806, Ο.558, Ξ.429) 
6 J.D. Denniston, Greek Prose Style (Oxford, 1960), p. 38. 
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the citizens, even though it may be used for the body of citizens.7 Aristotle does come 
close to ‘body of citizens’ with plēthos tōn politōn, but he uses this of the polis rather 
than of the politeia (1274b41). 
The occurrences of politeia from the beginning in extant Greek literature up to but 
not including Aristotle were traced in a 1982 monograph by Bordes, who catalogued the 
idioms in which this expression occurred.8 Bordes’ catalogue showed that the idioms 
revealed both continuity and innovation. From author to author and even in the same 
author, the idioms would be modified so that the verb remained the same even as its 
grammatical objects varied. So, for example, since the Greeks viewed the politeia as 
embodied most clearly in the archai, they sometimes might speak of granting the 
citizenship as granting the archai. Bordes viewed these instances as examples of 
substitutes—substitute idioms because they had substitute objects—that offered different 
ways of indicating the politeia. 
While Bordes considered about 40 idioms, in the present paper I consider mainly 
the idiom metadidonai tēs politeias and its substitutes. This idiom is especially 
informative because it is used repeatedly by Aristotle and because it leaves comparatively 
little room for misunderstanding. One can’t give a share in the constitution to an 
individual or to a group, especially if one doesn’t have an object to give, such as a copy 
of a written constitution. But one certainly can give a share in the condition of citizenship 
to an individual or to a group, as the Greeks did.9 
Politeia makes its debut in Herodotus 9.33-34, in its Ionic form, where Tisamenus 
insists that the Spartans make him a citizen, giving him a share of all the things connected 
with being a citizen (33.18-19)10 and where tōn pantōn metadidontes  is balanced by 
politēiēn aiteomenous (demanding citizenship, 34.3).11 This occurrence of tōn pantōn is a 
good example of a substitute recognized by Bordes, and it suggests that the condition of 
citizenship includes many components. Politeia is absent from the conference of the 
assassins in 3.80-84, which suggests that Herodotus did not associate the politeia with the 
 
 
7 Quality is familiar to students of Aristotle, since it is included in the categories. Condition is not included 
in the categories. Perhaps one can get some sense of condition in Aristotle by considering katastasis and its 
cognates, which are used by him when he considers setting up the politeia. 
8 J. Bordes, Politeia dans la pensée grecque jusqu’à Aristote (Paris, 1982). I am indebted to the late 
Professor M. Ostwald for having referred me to Bordes. 
9 It has been suggested to me that Diogenes Laertius provides an example in Greek of being able to give a 
share of things that aren’t objects at 1.24, where he uses metadidonai  in giving a report from Aristotle and 
Hippias about Thales’s having attributed (given a share of) soul to the unsouled, using as a sign the magnet 
and amber. Aristotle notes this peculiar antiquity about Thales at De Anima 405a19, where he suggests that 
Thales seems, based on the reports, to take it that the soul is some sort of mover, since he said that the 
magnet has soul because it moves iron. Ross refers to 411a8, where Aristotle observes that some say that it 
[soul] is mixed in the whole, whence perhaps Thales also thought that all things were full of gods. Of 
course DL does not offer a parallel case to giving a share in the politeia, since Thales’s giving is only a 
theoretical giving—what a theorist would do; Thales did not have an inventory of soul to distribute, though 
the Greek cities did have citizenship to distribute. Aristotle, De Anima, edited, with introduction and 
commentary, by Sir David Ross (Oxford, 1961). But again: The citizenship is a condition in which some 
can be allowed to share, while the soul is not a condition but rather something that might be in a certain 
condition. 
10 min poliētēn spheteron poiēsōntai tōn pantōn metadidontes. 
11 Bordes, Politeia, p. 39 et passim. Bordes includes tōn pantōn in her list of “principales formules 
comportant politeia ou une substitute de politeia,” p. 491. For the text see Ph.-E. Legrand, Hérodote. 
Histoires, vol. IX (Paris, 1954; repr. 1968). Retrieved from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. 
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rule of the multitude or with the oligarchy or with the monarchy. The idiom with 
metadidonai reappears in Thucydides, Isocrates, Lysias, Xenophon, the Pseudo- 
Xenophon, and Plato. 
In Republic VIII, for example, Socrates uses this idiom in his discussion of the 
origin of the democracy. He is describing the behavior of the poor when they come to 
power.12 Here the idiom and its substitute are clear, since the one verb metadōsi has both 
politeias and archōn as objects. This passage illustrates the association of the citizenship 
with the archai in Greek authors before Aristotle; shares in both are given at once. 
In Laws IV, the Athenian Stranger picks up the theme of stasis.13 Here the 
substitute idiom is archēs metadidonai; that the Stranger is talking about the politeia in 
using this substitute is made clear in the lines that follow. Since, for him, citizenship 
involves sharing in the archai, the Stranger holds out for the view that, where legitimate 
claimants are excluded completely from sharing in the archai, they do not enjoy the 
politeia or citizenship. As the language had developed to this point, while the 
understanding of politeia as citizenship had not been lost, it was being encroached upon by 
the understanding of politeia as merely taxis and especially the taxis of the archai. 
The Stranger reinforces his point in Laws VIII. 832B10-C3, where he is 
explaining the causes of inadequate military exercises as the non-citizenships (tas ou 
politeias).14 While this passage does not include the idiom, it does point to the situation in 
which the understanding of politeia as citizenship is abridged in favor of the 
understanding of politeia as merely taxis and in which the taxis may not have for its 
purpose the interest of the whole city.15 The contrast is drawn clearly by the phrases 
politeia men oudemia, stasiōteiai de with their 
particles—not a citizenship, but partisanships.16   
Aristotle uses the exact idiom metadidonai tēs politeias in Book II of the Politica 
in his discussion of the Spartan situation, where he says that, under the former kings, the 
Spartans conferred the citizenship17 and thus avoided a shortage of men. In Book III, in 
 
 
12“ they kill some of the others [the well to do], expel others, and give a share in the citizenship and the 
leading positions (metadōsi politeias te kai archōn) equally to those who are left, and for the most part 
these positions in it [the citizenship] come out of the lots (557A3-5).” 
13He says, as Bury rendered 715A8-B4: “Where offices of rule are open to contest, the victors in the contest 
monopolise power in the State so completely that they offer not the smallest share in office to the 
vanquished party or their descendants [hōste archēs mēd’ hotioun metadidonai tois ēttētheisin, mēte autois 
mēte ekgonois]; and each party keeps a watchful eye on the other, lest anyone should come into office and, 
in revenge for the former troubles, cause a rising against them. Such polities we, of course, deny to be 
polities, just as we deny that laws are true laws unless they are enacted in the interest of the common weal 
of the whole state.” R.G. Bury, ed., Plato: Laws (Cambridge, 1926; repr. 1952). 
14 “I say that the causes are the non-citizenships (tas ou politeias) that I have mentioned often in the 
previous discourses—democracy and oligarchy and tyranny. For of these none is a citizenship, but all of 
them would be called partisanships most correctly.” 
15 Two other Platonic passages that might be added to Bordes’ catalogue are Republic 503D9 
(metadidonai mēte timēs mēte archēs, to give a share of neither honor nor office) and Laws 768A1 (tōi plēthei 
metadidonai tēs kriseōs, to give a share in judging to the multitude).  
16 ‘Non-citizenship’ is an unusual expression but surely not much more incomprehensible on reflection than 
other abstract nouns with ‘non-‘ in English, such as ‘nonpartisanship’, which seem to give English speakers 
no difficulty. In any case, the Athenian makes it more comprehensible immediately by the mentioning of 
‘partisanship’, for which the Greek apparently is a coinage of Plato’s, since the only other occurrence (at 
least as given in LSJ) is in the late antique and spurious oration In Alcibiadem attributed to Andocides. 
17 metedidosan tēs politeias, 1270a35. 
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considering the free poor, he observes that while they cannot be given a share in the 
greatest positions, not to give them a share [in the archai or the politeia] and for them not 
to have a share would be fearful,18 since then the city will be full of enemies.19 Here 
Aristotle uses the idiom with metadidonai together with the usual Greek idiom for being a 
citizen—to share in the citizenship. Elsewhere also in the Politica, Aristotle uses 
substitutes for tēs politeias,20 such as tēs archēs and tōn archōn, with metadidonai. In 
Book IV, for example, in discussing the different politeiai, Aristotle speaks of the 
situation that would obtain if, in a city of 1,300 citizens, the wealthy 1,000 did not give a 
share in the archē to the 300 free poor who were like them in other ways (1290a35-36).21 
Again, in Book V, in the course of discussing causes of revolution in oligarchies, 
Aristotle mentions the case in which the oligarchs gave a share in citizenship to the 
multitude  (1306a25-26).22  
The Aristotelian Politeia of the Athenians represents the usage of the Lyceum 
when Aristotle was engaged in writing the Politica, and so its witness should not be 
overlooked. It uses the cognate apodidonai in reporting that citizenship had been given or 
given back to those furnishing their own weapons (4.2).23 See also 1274a16 (apodidonai . 
. . dunamin).24 It uses metadidonai in describing how Solon gave the least productive 
census group access only to the assembly and the jury courts (7.4)25 —the minimal 
citizenship. And it uses metadidonai in the story of Theramenes when it describes how he 
urged the Thirty to give a share in the public business (tōn pragmatōn) to the best men 
(36.1).26 Bordes includes tōn pragmatōn as a substitute with sharing (metechein) in the 
citizenship.27 As the story goes on, the oligarchs responded by enrolling 3,000 citizens as 
giving them a share in the citizenship (36.2);28 but Theramenes was displeased because, 
while deciding to give a share in the citizenship to the respectable people, the oligarchs 
gave it to the 3,000 only (36.2).29 And again, it uses this idiom in describing the 
condemnation of a psephism proposed by Thrasybulus which gave a share in the 
 
 
 
 
18 to de mē metadidonai mēde metechein phoberon, 1281b28-29. 
19 I follow Robinson’s lead here in taking metechein in the genitive as the object of metadidonai, even 
though Aristotle omits the article here where he might have used tou metechein. See Aristotle, Politics: 
Books III and IV. Translated with Introduction and Comments by Richard Robinson (Oxford, 1962), p. 37. 
Examples of Aristotle’s use of the article with µετϒξειν are found at 1275a23, 1292a1, and 1308b38. 
20 Bordes, Politeia, p. 491. 
21 And later on in this book, he suggests that one way to deal with a similar issue is to give a share of 
advising to everyone while only the rulers deliberate (1298b33-34). 
22 Not, I think, “hand over a share of the regime to the multitude,” as it is rendered in P.L.P. Simpson, The 
Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill, 1997), p. 221; nor, as his Commentary explains it, or perhaps compresses 
it with adjacent phrases, “enlist the support of the populace.” See P.L.P. Simpson, A Philosophical 
Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Chapel Hill, 1998), p. 384. 
23 apodedoto men hē politeia tois hopla parechomenois , a passage which can be added to those cited by 
Bordes. H. Oppermann, Aristotelis Athēnaiōn Politeia (Leipzig, 1928; repr. Stuttgart, 1968). Retrieved 
from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae. 
24 On this idiom see Bordes, Politeia, pp. 81-82. 
25 tois de to thētikon telousin ekklēsias kai dikastēriōn metedoke monon. 
26 metadounai de tōn pragmatōn tois beltistois. 
27 Bordes, Politeia, p. 492. 
28 hōs metadōsontes tēs politeias. 
29 boulomenoi metadounai tois epieikesi trischiliois monois metadidoasi. 
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citizenship to all those who had returned from the Peiraeus (40.2).30  See also the Politeia of 
the Athenians (7.2).31   
Politeia in the sense of ‘citizenship’, then, along with its substitutes, definitely 
was used by Aristotle and his school in these idioms and to some extent elsewhere. This 
use of politeia in the sense of ‘citizenship’ apparently did not disappear from Greek 
literature, since it is found, for example, as late as Diodorus Siculus in the age of 
Augustus. In his account of the foundation of Thurii, Diodorus notes, using the traditional 
idiom, that the inhabitants of Sybaris gave a share in the citizenship to many (pollois de 
metadidontes tēs politeias, 12.9.2).32 
While the literary sources for the use of politeia in the sense of ‘citizenship’ are 
unmistakable, inscriptions having to do with citizenship help to fill out the picture. 
Aristotle appears to have been aware of some of these inscriptions. Indeed, it would have 
been hard for him to miss them. 
 
Politeia in Inscriptions 
 
The author of the Politeia of the Athenians alerts us to the epigraphical evidence 
in 54.3, where he observes that the prytany secretary was named on the stone stēlai or 
slabs on which were recorded alliances, grants of proxenies, and [grants of] citizenship.33   
Wycherley cites grants of citizenship,34 and illustrative examples of grants of 
citizenship can be found in the Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum. One of these 
inscriptions, which is identified as a citizenship decree from Athens of the year 303/2 
B.C.—a generation after Aristotle’s death, includes the words “they gave valid 
citizenship to him and to his descendants according to the decree of the demos of the 
Athenians.”35 ‘To him and to his descendants’ (autōi kai [ekgo]nois) is the formula seen 
above in Laws 715A10-11. Another inscription, which is identified as a citizenship 
decree from Athens circa 215-210 B.C., indicates that someone “should be given the 
politeia and that he should be enrolled in the tribe and the deme and the phratry which he 
wished.”36 There are others as well.37 
 
 
 
 
30 en hōi metedidou tēs politeias pasi tois ek Peiraieōs sugkatelthousi. 
31 Here the author says that Solon “locked up the laws for a hundred years and arranged the politeia this 
way.” This way is Solon’s partition of the citizens into four groups according to the output of their 
households. Those whose households are most productive are given the big archai. Rhodes suggests 
“organized the constitution” for dietaxe tēn politeian, but the author clearly has in mind the condition of the 
citizens, whom he goes on to mention, not just the archai, and so the citizenship. ‘Constitution’ is 
unnecessary here. Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution. Translated with Introduction and Notes by P.J. 
Rhodes (London, 1984), p. 48. 
32 Diodori bibliotheca historica, vol. II, ed. F. Vogel, 3rd edn. (Stuttgart, 1890; repr. 1985), 12.9.2, p. 364. 
33 kai gar en tais stēlais pros tais summachiais kai proxeniais kai politeiais houtos anagraphetai. 
34 R.E. Wycherley, ed., The Athenian Agora, vol. III: Literary and Epigraphical Testimonia (Princeton, 
1957), p. 81, 221; p. 142, 456; and p. 135, 419=IG, II2, 1055, ll. 24-26. 
35 kurian tēn poli]te[ian] autōi kai [ekgo]nois, tēn dotheisan kata to psēph]is[ma tou] dēmou t[ou 
Ath]ēnaiōn. Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum XXVI, 90. 
36 dedosthai de autōi kai] politeian kai g[ra][psasthai phulēs kai dēmou kai phratria]s hēs an thelei. SEG 
XXVI, 97. Professor J. McInerney, Department of Classical Studies and Ancient History, University of 
Pennsylvania, has advised me on the translation of this inscription. 
37 Other examples can be found in SEG XXVI 83 and 96; XXIX 94 and 121; and XXXVII 90. 
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In 1893, Sandys issued a text with apparatus and notes, and this text saw a second 
edition in 1912. In his notes, Sandys identified an inscription which he considered the 
oldest corresponding to Aristotle’s witness in 54.3.38 It indicated that the adopted citizen 
was enrolled in the tribe and the deme and the phratry as entered by the secretary on the 
stone stēlē. The inscription had been reconstructed and published in 1883 and now is 
included in Inscriptiones Graecae with a date of 387/6, or shortly before Aristotle was 
born.39 It clearly represents a grant of citizenship, even though it does not have an 
occurrence of politeia. Instead of mentioning the politeia, it says that the initiate was 
enrolled into the Athenians. If Aristotle had this inscription and others like it in mind, 
why is politeia not used here? 
The answer may be that, as Osborne has suggested, there are three formulae for 
decrees that grant the citizenship—the ethnic, which uses the name of the people of 
which the new citizen will become one; the generic, which uses politeia; and the 
intermediate, which states that someone is to be a politēs.40 All three of these formulae 
happily are reflected in Book IX of Herodotus. Both the intermediate and the generic 
occur in 9.33.18-19, though the generic there uses a substitute idiom. And Herodotus uses 
the ethnic where he reports the claim of Tisamenus that his brother also must be made a 
Spartiate (9.33.25). Thus it would not be inappropriate for the author to describe an 
inscription as granting the citizenship if it used the ethnic formula rather than the generic 
formula.41 
That politeia was used regularly for citizenship in inscriptions has not penetrated 
studies of Aristotle very far in the century since Sandys. The occurrence of politeia to 
mark grants of citizenship on the official stone slabs designed for public consumption, 
however, suggests a well-established and noncontroversial convention for this use. And 
so it suggests that most literate Greeks, as well as those who could not read but who 
might have had the inscriptions read to them, would have understood politeia here as 
citizenship. Thus both literary evidence and epigraphical evidence suggest that politeia 
would have made many Greeks think first of citizenship. It is not surprising, then, that 
Aristotle sometimes used politeia in the sense of ‘citizenship’, as many of his hearers and 
readers would have expected him to. Sometimes, yes. But when and where? That remains 
to be worked out by weighing the interpretation of passage after passage. 
 
Alternative Interpretations 
 
 
 
 
 
38 J.E. Sandys, Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens, second edition, revised and enlarged (London, 1912), p. 
210. 
39Ephēmeris archaiologikē 1883, pp. 37-38. I wish to thank Professor D.G. Romano of the University 
of Pennsylvania’s Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology (Mediterranean Section) and Department of 
Classical Studies for identifying this inscription as IG II2 25 and for providing other assistance with the 
epigraphical materials. 
40 M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens, III-IV, Verhandelingen van de Koninklijke Academie voor 
Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Kunsten van België, Klasse der Letteren 109 (Brussels, 1983), p. 155. 
41 Rhodes and P. Gauthier also have studied these grants of citizenship in the inscriptions. P.J. Rhodes, A 
Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia (Oxford, 1981), pp. 602-603; P. Gauthier, Les cités 
grecques et leurs bienfaiteurs, Bulletin de correspondence Hellénique, Supplément XII (Athènes, 1985), 
pp. 149-154 et passim. 
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Since Aristotle was accustomed to using politeia in the traditional idioms and to 
seeing it used to denote the condition of a citizen, or citizenship, in inscriptions, the 
challenge is to determine how he was using it outside the traditional idioms. Hansen 
offers ten non-idiomatic passages in which politeia does not appear to have the sense of 
‘constitution’ or, if it does, not exclusively that. 42 These examples deserve close scrutiny. 
I shall consider one of Hansen’s and one other. 
In 1297b1-3, where Hansen gives “constitution” intending “‘body of citizens’ as a 
connotation,” Sinclair-Saunders in the first instance gives “Citizenship ought to be 
reserved for those who carry arms,” though this translation is qualified in a note, which 
retranslates “the politeia, constitution, should be made up exclusively of those who carry 
arms,” and where a second qualification is added to the effect that “Aristotle may 
however mean polity.”43 More literally still, one might offer ‘the citizenship must be of 
(or for) those who possess arms only’. At the very least, this text indicates the uncertainty 
of scholars over the traditional ‘constitution’ approach. Aristotle’s point here is to justify 
a property assessment in connection with citizenship, even though the amount of the 
assessment cannot be set once and for all. 
Aside from Hansen’s examples, in 1284b17-19, Aristotle says: “It is better for the 
lawmaker in the beginning so to bring together the politeia that it will not need such a 
course of treatment [as ostracism].” It would make little sense to say that the politeia will 
need a course of treatment if it is interpreted as the constitution or arrangement of offices. 
How would one treat an arrangement of offices by ostracism? The point of ostracism was 
to remove individuals from the condition of citizenship rather than to eliminate offices; 
the name of an office was not written on a shard.  So here translation by ‘citizenship’ 
instead of ‘constitution’ leads to a plausible alternative interpretation of an otherwise 
opaque text. 
Conclusion 
 
I conclude that Aristotle sometimes used politeia to denote citizenship not only in 
the traditional idioms but elsewhere as well. It may be, as Hansen says, that constitution 
in the sense of an arrangement of offices is the most common use and that the idiomatic 
concrete use is the next most important. Hansen’s view will be confirmed or 
disconfirmed when the catalogue is completed. But whatever the catalogue shows, it will 
remain that Aristotle does use politeia to denote citizenship, and recognizing that he does 
opens the possibility of reinterpretation of some otherwise puzzling passages. 
 
 
 
 
 
42Hansen, pp. 95-96: “In Aristotle’s Politics much the most common meaning of politeia is “constitution” 
in the sense of the structure of the city’s political institutions, its archai in the broad sense of the term, but 
in quite a few passages politeia has “citizen structure” or in a concrete sense “the body of citizens” 
[citizenry] as its principal meaning or at least as a connotation.” The condition that the citizens share seems 
to have fallen out of the discussion here, unless “citizen structure” is supposed to supply it; but the 
condition denoted by politeia is not simply structural. 
43Aristotle, The Politics. Translated by T.A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders 
(London, 1992), p. 274. 
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